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Myron A. Penner
Some claim that cognitive science of religion (CSR) either completely “explains 
religion away,” or at the very least calls the epistemic status of religious belief 
into question. Others claim that religious beliefs are the cognitive outputs of 
systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, and thus CSR provides 
positive epistemic support for religious belief. I argue that (i) CSR does not 
provide evidence for atheism, but (ii) if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellec-
tual aid and comfort,” (iii) CSR does not provide evidence for theism, but (iv) 
if one is a theist, CSR provides qualified support for Reformed Epistemology.
Introduction
Cognitive science of religion (CSR) is a multi-disciplinary research 
program that seeks to map and understand the cognitive systems that un-
derwrite, generate, sustain, and transmit religious belief. While “religion” 
is notoriously difficult to define, cognitive scientists of religion tend to 
identify religious beliefs as those that are importantly related to belief in 
supernatural agents. Though not without its detractors, a common and 
influential model within CSR is the idea that belief in supernatural agents 
is the cognitively natural output of evolved cognitive processes that were 
selected for other purposes; typically, the relevant processes are some com-
bination of Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device (HADD) and Theory 
of Mind (ToM). With a fine-grained brush, CSR paints a thoroughgoing 
naturalistic picture of religious belief. As a result, some have assumed that 
CSR either completely “explains religion away,” or at the very least calls 
the epistemic status of religious belief into question. Others have argued 
that given the naturalness of religious belief as the cognitive outputs of 
systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, CSR provides positive 
epistemic support for religious belief.
How should data from CSR influence the epistemic status of religious 
belief in general, or theism in particular? I will focus on the latter ques-
tion: addressing the epistemological significance of CSR to theistic religious 
belief is the main subject of this paper. More specifically, I will argue for the 
following four claims: (i) CSR does not provide evidence for atheism, but (ii) 
if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellectual aid and comfort,” (iii) CSR does 
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not provide evidence for theism, but (iv) if one is a theist, CSR provides 
qualified support for Reformed Epistemology.
I. CSR and Atheism
I.A. Empirical Science, Testability, and Theism
The relationship between theism and its empirical content is complex. 
Does theism have any empirical consequences? For Christian theists, the 
answer must be “yes.” On one telling, the Christian narrative is of a God 
who creates and orders the natural world, brings creatures into being, in-
cluding some who bear the imago dei, cultivates a community of followers 
from the dawn of civilization, and becomes incarnate in the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth through whom all things are being reconciled to God. 
This story, if true, entails minimally that there is a natural world, there are 
creatures, some creatures bear the imago dei, there has been a community 
of God-followers, and Jesus of Nazareth existed. One might be tempted 
to think that these simple empirical consequences of Christian theism are 
easily observable and thus provide some measure of empirical support for 
theism. But that would be mistaken in two respects.
Predictive Entailment. First, from some hypothesis H predicting or 
making it likely that some event E will obtain, and our observation that E 
obtains, we initially don’t learn very much about whether H is true; this is 
because there could be some other hypothesis H′ inconsistent with H that 
also predicts E. What we do learn in this instance is our observation that 
E hasn’t falsified H. In order for our observation of E to provide support 
for H, E needs to be put in the context of alternative hypotheses. One way 
to do this is via inference to the best explanation (also known as abduc-
tive reasoning); another way is by applying what Elliot Sober calls “the 
Surprise Principle.”1 Here’s a relevant hypothetical example of abductive 
reasoning. Let E be the event of Jesus of Nazareth existing, let O in this 
case be a conclusive observational data set that makes the existence of 
Jesus on an epistemic par with the existence of, say, Abraham Lincoln, and 
let H be the hypothesis of Christian theism along the bare lines sketched 
above.2 We can then form the following abductive argument:
1. We have the conclusive data set O—Jesus of Nazareth existed.
2. The best explanation for O is H—i.e., that Christian theism is true.
3. Therefore, Christian theism is true.
As it stands, this isn’t a very good argument. Even assuming that (1) is true, 
it’s clear that (2) can be rejected. That’s because in terms of explanatory 
1Sober, Core Questions in Philosophy, 32–35.
2I’ll assume also that O doesn’t include any alleged evidence with respect to miracles, 
resurrections, exorcisms and the like. Thus, by hypothesis O supports only the claim that the 
human Jesus of the gospels was an historical figure.
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power with respect to this particular O, there’s no advantage Christian 
theism has over myriad competing alternatives.
Another method for determining whether some observation O sup-
ports one hypothesis H over a competing hypothesis H′ is by determining 
whether both conditions of the Surprise Principle are satisfied:
C1: If H were true, O would be expected.
C2: If H′ were true, O would be surprising.3
For ease of comparison let O and H remain the same as above, and let H′ 
be the hypothesis that Christian theism is false. Here we can see that C1 
is satisfied, but C2 is not, for if it turned out that Christian theism were 
false, making the observation O (which you’ll recall was the data set sup-
porting the claim that the man Jesus was an historical figure) wouldn’t be 
surprising in this case.
Auxiliary Assumptions. A second complication in determining whether 
some observation fits the empirical content of theism has to do with the 
crucial role played by auxiliary assumptions in generating testable obser-
vation statements for many theistic claims. Needing auxiliary assumptions 
to generate a testable observation is no mark against theism; many claims 
in science are only testable when embedded within a theoretical frame-
work that employs assumptions at various levels. For example, we can 
test for the Higgs boson not because the claim “the Higgs boson exists” 
is testable all by itself. Rather, we can test for the Higgs boson only if we 
bring to the testing all sorts of assumptions about what the world is like 
and what the world would be like if the Higgs boson were to exist. But 
in order for an auxiliary assumption to be helpful in generating a plau-
sible testable claim, the assumption should be less controversial and enjoy 
more epistemic support than the claim being tested. This is where things 
become tricky in employing auxiliary assumptions to get testable theistic 
statements.
Consider one claim from the Christian theistic story above: human 
beings bear the imago dei. What is the imago dei? How could we test for it? 
Suppose one held that the following assumption were true:
A1: A creature bears the imago dei if and only if it weighs more than 5 
lbs.
If A1 were true, determining whether something bears the imago dei would 
be a straightforward procedure. But there’s no reason to think that A1 
is true; the challenge with many theistic claims is that the assumptions 
needed to generate testable observation statements are at least as contro-
versial as the claim itself.
3For an in depth discussion of the inductive logic operative in scientific inquiry, see Sober, 
Evidence and Evolution, 1–108. 
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I.B. Potential Pathways of CSR Support for Atheism
With this background, we’re now ready to look at different ways that 
CSR—simplified and reduced to the claim that belief in supernatural 
agents is formed by natural processes that arose out of evolutionary 
mechanisms—could possibly provide support for atheism.
Theory Confirmation. On the assumption that CSR is true, one way CSR 
could provide support for atheism is if it could be shown that CSR is more 
probable on atheism than on theism. But utilizing the simple schemas dis-
cussed above with respect to the testability of theism, demonstrates that 
challenges similar to those faced by theists are also present when consid-
ering the relationship between empirical claims and atheism.
Let A be atheism and T theism. Now consider Sober’s Surprise Principle. 
According to it, does CSR support A over T? Recall the two conditions that 
must be satisfied if this is the case:
C3: If A were true, CSR would be expected.
C4: If T were true, CSR would be surprising.
C3 in this case has a measure of plausibility. For the most part, CSR 
provides a thoroughgoing and robust naturalistic explanation for many 
phenomena associated with religious belief. Unlike some other cognitive 
domains that really only make sense if the objects of cognition are real 
(e.g., physical objects in the case of sensory cognition), CSR provides a 
means of explaining why people believe in gods even if there are no gods.4 
As an explanation of religious belief, CSR does have a certain degree of 
“fit” with atheism.
The problem, however, is with respect to C4—what reason is there to 
think that it’s true? In other words, what reason is there to think that if 
God existed, it would be surprising that belief in gods is formed as a span-
drel of innate cognitive mechanisms? I see no plausible way of making 
that argument, because doing so will require at the very least conjoining 
auxiliary assumptions to theism that are at least as controversial as theism 
itself.
One might think that the Surprise Principle imposes a needlessly heavy 
burden on the atheist. “One doesn’t need to show that CSR is surprising on 
theism,” the atheist might protest. “Even if CSR were expected on theism, 
all that’s needed is to show that the probability of CSR on atheism is greater 
than probability of CSR on theism.” But the challenge here is that there’s no 
non-circular, non-question-begging way of assigning probabilities where 
4One might worry that, at least with respect to the traditional theistic view that God is a 
necessary being, the claim that CSR explains how people could believe in God even if there 
were no God, includes a necessary falsehood. This gets us into the realm of reasoning about 
counterpossibles, and while the semantic and interpretive issues are many and varied, there 
are various models for how this could work with respect to reasoning about God and gods. 
See Penner, “Personal Anti-Theism,” 325–337; see also Davis and Franks, “Counterpossibles 
and the ‘Terrible’ Divine Command Deity,” 1–19; and Mawson, “On Determining How Im-
portant It is Whether or Not There is a God,” 267–177. 
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the probability of CSR on theism comes out lower than the probability of 
CSR on atheism.
Similar challenges arise when trying to frame CSR as support for 
atheism via abductive reasoning. Consider the following argument:
4. CSR is true.
5. The best explanation for CSR’s being true is atheism.
6. So, probably atheism is true.
Even granting (4), this argument fails because there’s no reason to think 
that (5) is true; theism can explain CSR equally as well as atheism, for 
one can easily cash out a theistic hypothesis that fits the CSR data as well 
as does an atheistic hypothesis. All else being equal, it seems that the 
pathway of theory confirmation doesn’t hold much promise in using CSR 
to marshal support for atheism.
However, perhaps not all is equal between theism and naturalism with 
respect to explaining CSR. According to Jason Marsh, locating CSR’s ac-
count of the cognition of supernatural agency within an evolutionary 
framework leads to a set of observations that are much more likely on 
naturalism than on theism.5 Consider the following observation:
E*: For a variety of biological, cognitive, and environmental reasons, 
early humans, including many anatomically and behaviorally 
modern humans, originally lacked a concept of God and were re-
ligiously restricted to concepts of limited, and sometimes mean, 
supernatural agents. As a result, many early humans, including 
many early anatomically and behaviorally modern humans, failed 
to believe in God or in anything like God. The nonbelief in ques-
tion was both naturally occurring and nonresistant.6
With E* so defined, Marsh goes on to present the following argument:
(P1) We know E* to be true (or at least E* is very plausible).
(P2) Naturalism has much more predictive power with respect to E* 
than theism.
(P3) Naturalism starts out at least as plausible as theism (i.e., natural-
ism is at least as probable as theism independent of all evidence).
(C) So, other evidence held equal, theism is very probably false.
Marsh’s (P2) is similar to (5) above, according to which atheism provides 
the best explanation for the truth of CSR. Marsh draws on CSR in order 
to flesh out E*, and he claims that philosophical naturalism, “the claim 
that no supernatural agents exist, that the world was not intentionally 
5Marsh, “Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief,” 349–376.
6Marsh, “Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief,” 359.
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designed, and that nature is causally closed and morally indifferent to 
human beings and to their flourishing,”7 provides a better explanation 
than theism for the fact that the supernatural agent concepts of early hu-
mans were not of the God of theism, but rather some other types of finite 
supernatural agents.
Defending (P2) requires both defending that (i) E* is to be expected on 
naturalism, and (ii) E* would be surprising if theism is true. I think that (i) 
is very plausible—that is, I think that given naturalism, it is reasonable to 
think that the CSR mechanisms underwriting supernatural agent beliefs 
in early humans and beyond involve many and varied types of finite su-
pernatural agents. What about (ii)? Does theism make E* less likely than it 
is on naturalism? Marsh thinks so:
Given naturalism’s commitment to indifference about whether early hu-
mans would be theists, and given that a perfectly good God would desire 
to enter into a divine-human relationship with early humans, naturalism 
makes E* comparatively much more likely than theism. Again, God might 
have reasons that we can’t imagine for permitting E*, as so-called skeptical 
theists will point out. But again, it is no less likely that God has reasons that 
we can’t imagine for never permitting E*.8
Marsh seems to be appealing to intuitions about what we should expect 
God to do if God were a familiar sort of agent.
Consider, for example, Sue, the city planner for fictional Metro City, 
who values the contribution that parks and green spaces make to the 
overall quality of life for the city’s residents. In fact, Sue would go so far 
as to say that it was important for her that citizens had easy access to 
multiple parks. Suppose also that while the quantity of, and accessibility 
to, park space in Metro City is directly a function of Sue’s say-so, it turns 
out that park space in the city is very rare and hard to get to. In this case, 
we’d be justified in claiming that Sue is not a very good city planner. The 
case of Sue can serve as an analogy for how Marsh is assessing theism. 
One might wonder, as Marsh seems to, that if God exists, and having a 
divine-human relationship is important to God, why is belief in a theistic 
God not a significantly more natural product of the biological, cognitive, 
and social factors that have shaped human beings from our evolutionary 
past and into the present? God by definition can’t be a bad planner, but by 
observations similar to the sort we made of Sue, certainly seems to be one. 
If Metro City’s park space were the product of a good city planner who 
valued park space, the facts on the ground would look much different. 
And similarly, one might think, if it were important to God that human 
beings believed in a theistic God, wouldn’t God make it more natural bio-
logically, cognitively, and socially to believe in such a God?
Recall that what we’re after here in assessing Marsh’s argument is 
whether naturalism has greater predictive power theism with respect 
7Marsh, “Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief,” 351.
8Marsh, “Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief,” 359.
111COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION, ATHEISM, AND THEISM
to E*. The first condition of Sober’s Surprise Principle has been satisfied 
in comparing naturalism to theism as explanatory hypotheses for the 
natural, non-resistant belief in finite supernatural agents—this is pretty 
much what one would expect if naturalism is true. But is E* surprising on 
theism, thus satisfying the second condition of the Surprise Principle and 
therefore providing a reason to think that naturalistic atheism is true?
There are two different ways for theists to respond here. The first way is 
to claim that, ultimately, we don’t have a good way of assigning the likeli-
hood of E* on theism, in which case, we don’t really know whether theism 
fares better or worse than naturalism as an explanation of E*. Such a move 
would be consistent with a trajectory within Christian theism that has 
tended to emphasize the cognitive distance between creator and creature. 
Long before “skeptical theism” became a term of art in contemporary phi-
losophy of religion, theists have wondered how and in what way human 
language about God could refer to God. That is, theologians have long 
wrestled with the epistemological consequences of the ontological gap 
between God and creatures. So, while Marsh claims that the following 
likelihood is true:
Pr (E* | naturalism) > Pr (E* | theism)
one theistic move is to claim that because we don’t know how likely E* 
is on theism, we’ve no plausible way of judging whether the right com-
parison of likelihoods is >, <, or =.
However, this sort of skeptical refuge isn’t a very satisfying response. It 
would be better for the theist if there were some principled way of cashing 
out a theistic hypothesis (i.e., not ad hoc, consistent with traditional theism, 
etc.) according to which E* is at least just as likely as it is on naturalism. As 
discussed in section I.A above, in order for theism to generate testable ob-
servation statements, theism must be conjoined with auxiliary statements. 
And the challenge facing Marsh is similar to the (often unacknowledged) 
challenge theists face when pointing to some empirical claim as evidence 
for God’s existence: needing some controversial auxiliary assumption 
to be true in order for the empirical claim to count the way the person 
making the observation thinks it does. Marsh needs to assume that God is 
relevantly similar to Sue the city planner in order to defend (P2), and he 
does note that on a traditional theistic account, the God of perfect-being 
theology would lovingly “desire to enter into a divine-human relation-
ship with early humans.”9 But the further auxiliary assumptions that are 
required in order for E* to be more likely on naturalism than theism are 
assumptions of the following sort:
AA1: Early humans had no divine-human relationship with the theis-
tic God.
9Marsh, “Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief,” 359.
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But different and principled auxiliary or background assumptions are 
available to theists. For example, consider the following:
AA2: Humans, including early humans, are immortal and have a cog-
nitive life that survives their bodily death.
AA3: God is able to relate to creatures who lack accurate or complete 
God concepts.
AA4: God could use evolution as the mechanism by which divine im-
age bearers are brought about.10
Assuming AA2–AA4 gives the theist a different set of resources with 
which to assess the likelihood of E* on theism. Let’s look at each of these 
assumptions in turn.
Conjoining AA2 to theism allows for the possibility that early humans, 
while having no initial concept of a theistic God, eventually were capable 
of acquiring the theistic God concepts that according to Marsh would be 
required for a loving God to enter into divine-human relationships. Is 
AA2 a reasonable assumption for theists, qua theists, to make? It certainly 
seems so—the continued cognitive existence of persons beyond their 
death is part of various theistic accounts of human persons.
AA3 is also reasonable for theists to assume. If something like AA3 
were not assumed, it would be impossible for God to relate to creatures at 
all. This is because as an infinite being, a complete or entirely accurate set 
of God concepts is beyond creaturely cognitive grip. So, in order for God 
to enter in to loving relationship with creatures, there must of necessity be 
some conceptual accommodation on God’s part to allow for the cognitive 
distance between creature and creator.
What about AA4, the assumption that evolution is a means by which 
God could bring about creatures who bear God’s image? It’s worth noting 
that some of Darwin’s earliest defenders included Christian theologians 
and scientists who were Darwin’s contemporaries and had no reservations 
about thinking of divine creation along evolutionary lines.11 True, not all 
theists endorse AA4, but as long as there has been evolutionary theory, 
there have been theistic evolutionists.
Now, with AA1–AA4 in hand, the predictive power of theism with 
respect to E* changes quite a bit. Given AA4, it makes perfect sense that 
God concepts would evolve over time. In fact, it would be surprising if 
early humans had a set of God concepts qualitatively very similar to the 
concepts employed by humans much later in evolutionary time. But given 
AA3, early humans lacking complete or accurate God concepts would 
be no barrier for divine-human relationship, and given AA2, there’d be 
no limit on the time available for humans to have their cognitive and 
10I’m making no assumption here about “guided mutations” or cataclysmic divine inter-
ventions in evolutionary processes.
11See Livingstone, Darwin’s Forgotten Defenders.
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conceptual array they utilize in relating to the divine to be shaped and 
enhanced over time.
In order to assess the predictive power of naturalism and theism with 
respect to E*, one needs to conjoin certain auxiliary assumptions to theism 
in order to determine how theism fares in comparison with naturalism. 
Marsh, for example assumes that a loving theistic God would want re-
lationship with humans, including early humans, but also assumes AA1 
according to which early humans had no loving relationship with God. 
But as we’ve seen, there are a whole slate of auxiliary assumptions within 
theistic reach according to which the cognitive portrait painted by CSR 
and evolutionary psychology of the religious life of early humans is pretty 
much what one would expect.
Unreliability Arguments. The pathway of theory confirmation promised 
to be a direct path from CSR to atheism, but proved to be a dead end. This 
section and the next explore whether there are more productive routes 
from CSR to atheism via less direct paths. One such indirect route is via 
some sort of unreliability argument. In brief, an unreliability argument 
attempts to show that because some particular way of forming beliefs is 
error-prone, one therefore has a defeater for accepting the outputs of that 
way of forming beliefs. And on one sort of analysis, the cognitive mecha-
nisms that support religious belief do seem incredibly unreliable. They 
produce wildly divergent and inconsistent outputs—the religious land-
scape is many and varied. But one doesn’t need CSR to show that; one just 
needs to look around. What does CSR add to the observation of religious 
pluralism such that taken together, they provide evidence for atheism?
One might think that CSR provides a nuanced and empirically sup-
ported model that explains why we shouldn’t expect the reliability of 
the mechanisms that produce belief in gods. Because religious belief is a 
by-product of systems selected for other purposes, we shouldn’t expect 
them to be reliable in those spandrel domains—that we have religious 
beliefs at all is held to be an evolutionary accident. However, this line of 
reasoning is fraught with problems, many of which concern the relation-
ship between reliable faculties, truth, and adaptive value. To be sure, there 
is no necessary connection between adaptive belief (and the systems that 
generate adaptive belief) and true belief. But there’s no necessary discon-
nection, either.
Granting that it’s logically possible that an adaptive cognitive system 
can yield unreliable outputs, or that a reliable cognitive system be non-
adaptive (either adaptively neutral or even maladaptive), one might 
ask: isn’t it just unlikely that a system with no adaptive value could be 
reliable?12 And if it turns out that religious belief itself isn’t adaptive, but 
merely a by-product of cognitive mechanisms selected for other purposes, 
then we’d have an undermining defeater for the outputs of these belief-
forming processes.
12This question was posed by an anonymous reviewer.
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A lot here turns on how one “counts” cognitive systems, and how one 
measures the degree to which outputs of some system contribute to an 
organism’s ability to survive and reproduce. But setting aside those com-
plications, think, for example, about the cognitive systems that underwrite 
abstract and theoretical reasoning in science. In addressing the question 
of whether one can give an evolutionary account of abstract rationality, 
Elliott Sober observes the following.13
This question imagines there to be a split between those techniques for pro-
cessing information which have some practical consequences for survival, 
and those techniques which are central to “pure” science and thereby have 
no impact on reproductive success. If this were a correct way to partition 
the organism’s inferential equipment, then there indeed could not be selec-
tion for the methodology of science. But from this it does not follow that the 
methodology could not have emerged because of natural selection. Pleiot-
ropy is a familiar phenomenon within evolution; a single gene combination 
may be responsible for two phenotypic traits, only one of which is selected 
for. The other trait gets carried along for the ride, as it were. This free rider 
may be neutral, or even deleterious in impact on the organism’s overall fit-
ness. So even if there were a real distinction between “practical” techniques 
of inference and “purely theoretical” ones, this would not block an evolu-
tionary account of theoretical method.14
This description, then, gives a plausible scenario in which we have a 
cognitive apparatus that is both reliable—as reliable as abstract scientific 
reasoning is, suitably qualified—but not adaptive per se. This supports 
my earlier claim that, structurally, the adaptive value and the degree of 
reliability are distinct features for cognitive systems that may or may not 
correlate. Even if it turns out that religious belief is not adaptive, that 
doesn’t entail that religious belief forming mechanisms are therefore un-
reliable.
It is sometimes said that evolution is blind to truth—but it’s more ac-
curate to say that evolution is blind to truth-values; natural selection is 
blind to both truth and falsity. Cognitive systems are selected for in virtue 
of their adaptive value; some systems will be reliable (perhaps because 
reliability contributes to adaptive value, perhaps not), and some systems 
will be unreliable (perhaps because unreliability contributes to adaptive 
value, perhaps not). And what’s true of cognitive systems with respect to 
their being selected for evolutionary purposes is also true of any cognitive 
spandrels. Again: there’s no necessary connection between spandrels and 
true belief; but there’s no necessary disconnection, either. So, even if one 
were to grant the unreliability of religious belief-forming mechanisms, it 
is difficult to see how CSR explains that unreliability in a way that would 
provide evidence for atheism.
13Sober, “The Evolution of Rationality,” 95–120.
14Sober, “The Evolution of Rationality,” 99–100. 
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But isn’t there something of use to the atheist in pointing out what seem 
to be the “wildly divergent outputs” of the cognitive processes that under-
write religious beliefs? Doesn’t CSR and widespread religious diversity 
provide some sort of argument for atheism? Matthew Braddock has argued 
that, if not providing evidence for atheism, CSR plus the widespread di-
versity of religious beliefs should cause monotheists to suspend judgment 
about the outputs of the mechanisms that give rise to religious beliefs.15
Braddock’s detailed and interesting paper presents a two stage ar-
gument. In the first stage, he argues that monotheists should suspend 
judgment about the reliability of the CSR mechanisms that underwrite 
and support god beliefs. This is because monotheists, in virtue of their 
monotheism (hereafter I’ll just use “theists”) must acknowledge that the 
mechanisms that give rise to god beliefs in the vast majority of cases, have 
generated false god beliefs. In the second stage of the argument, Braddock 
acknowledges that CSR mechanisms by themselves are not solely respon-
sible for god beliefs—rather, they are embedded within a host of other 
contributing factors for god beliefs, including sociocultural influences. 
Could these other contributors correct for the underlying unreliability of 
CSR mechanisms? According to Braddock, absent independent evidence 
that these other contributors do correct for the unreliability of CSR mecha-
nisms, we should suspend judgment about the overall reliability of the 
entire belief-forming process for god beliefs, a process to which unreliable 
CSR mechanisms are a significant contributor. The ultimate conclusion of 
Braddock’s two-stage argument is that no god belief is justified, absent 
independent evidence for it. Has Braddock shown, contra to what I am 
claiming in this section, that CSR provides evidence for atheism, at least 
to the degree that it demonstrates that theism is unjustified? By my lights, 
he has not.
For ease of analysis, I’m going to simplify Braddock’s two-stage argu-
ment into a single unreliability argument that utilizes the central premises 
and inferences to which Braddock is appealing. Let “CSRM” stand for the 
common belief forming processes that generate god beliefs, and let “O” 
stand for factors other than CSRM that influence god beliefs. So under-
stood, Braddock seems to be claiming the following:
(i) Theists must hold that CSRM are massively unreliable.
(ii) Theists have no evidence that O corrects for the unreliability of 
CSRM.
(iii) One should suspend judgment about outputs of a belief-forming 
process that is deemed massively unreliable and not corrected for.
(iv) Thus, theists should suspend judgment about the reliability of 
CSRM and are not justified in accepting some output of CSRM 
(absent independent evidence for that output).
15Braddock, “Debunking Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 268–287.
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Before considering the premises of Braddock’s argument, it’s worth 
pointing out the limited scope of unreliability arguments in providing evi-
dence for atheism. Even if Braddock’s argument is sound (though I’ll argue 
below there are good reasons to reject its premises), at most this would 
mean that CSR provides some evidence for agnosticism, not atheism. All 
that would be commended by the conclusion of Braddock’s argument, if 
sound, is that theists should suspend judgment about the reliability of the 
cognitive mechanisms that underwrite their intuitive religious beliefs, and 
if they are honest inquirers, look to see if there is independent evidence 
that factors other than innate cognition (socio-cultural factors, theistic ar-
guments, etc.) that support either theism or atheism. But even granting 
Braddock’s argument, we can see that CSR falls short of providing evi-
dence for atheism.
With respect to (i), Braddock claims that theists must claim this because 
being committed to the truth of theism entails holding that any god belief 
incompatible with theism is false. And seeing as how the vast majority 
of god beliefs that have been held going back to human pre-history have 
been incompatible with theism, theists must acknowledge that CSRM are 
massively unreliable. Here Braddock is holding a very tight connection 
between a cognitive mechanism typically generating false beliefs and that 
mechanism being unreliable. However, this fails to account for two alethi-
cally relevant properties—namely, the properties of approximating truth 
and entailing truth.
What is it for a belief to be approximately true? The concept of approxi-
mate truth has played a prominent role in discussions in philosophy of 
science and the realism/anti-realism debate. Realists in philosophy of sci-
ence claim that the success of science is good reason to think that scientific 
theories are true, or approximately true, descriptions of the world, even 
at the level of unobservable entities. Thus, even while technically false or 
incomplete in some respects, a theory can be taken as approximating truth 
if there’s a sufficient degree of accuracy in the theory to do so. And when 
it comes to CSRM, a theist is perfectly within her epistemic rights to hold 
that CSRM, while technically delivering false beliefs, may in fact be deliv-
ering outputs that approximate truth in important respects—particularly 
when the outputs attribute divine agency to events that the theist would 
also agree are a function of divine agency. True, the theist is committed 
to the polytheist having a false belief, but she could also hold that there’s 
something about the polytheist’s belief that approximates truth.
This brings us to the second alethic property that is relevant to assessing 
(i) of my reconstructed argument of Braddock: the property of entailing 
truth. It is often the case that false propositions entail true propositions 
such that false belief can be a pathway, via inference, to truth. For example, 
suppose you walk through your living room and see an unlit candle on 
the coffee table in front of the sofa. Suppose also that five minutes later 
you re-enter the living room and now you see that the candle is lit. You 
immediately form the belief that Bob lit the candle. You also infer that you 
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are not alone. It turns out that Bob didn’t light the candle—it was Sue. But 
your belief that you’re not alone is true. And that true belief that you’re 
not alone is sufficient to justify all sorts of rational behaviors. Now, a theist 
can have a similar view towards CSRM with respect to their degree of 
reliability. A theist can without contradiction agree with Braddock that, 
technically, CSRM have delivered false beliefs in the vast, vast majority 
of cases. But that doesn’t make them completely useless from an alethic 
perspective. For it could be that in important contexts they deliver outputs 
that (a) approximate truth in important respects or (b) entail true proposi-
tions that justify all sorts of religiously relevant and rational behaviors. 
Thus, the theist can deny (i) if “massively unreliable” means “of no alethic 
significance.”
Moreover, judgments about the reliability or unreliability of any cogni-
tive system will need to take into account factors of context and scope. For 
example, sensory cognition may be highly reliable in some contexts (good 
light, close distances, no mind-altering drugs, etc.), but highly unreliable 
in other contexts (poor light, long distances, etc.). It could be that the op-
eration of agency detection and theory of mind in the religious domain, 
spandrel though it may be, is in fact highly reliable in producing beliefs of 
a certain kind. Suppose naturalism is false, and that there is a domain of 
existence that transcends the material—religious cognition seems pretty 
reliable at generating or supporting beliefs like that.16
Return now to Braddock’s central claim that because the vast majority 
of outputs for CSRM have thought of supernatural agency in terms of 
polytheism, theists must hold that CSRM are massively unreliable. 
However, I’ve argued that, conceptually, theists can view the operations 
of CSRM among polytheistic religions throughout history and into the 
present as having a certain kind of alethically relevant reliability, even 
while technically delivering false outputs. This is because false beliefs 
can still approximate truth in significant ways, and it can also entail true 
beliefs that are religiously significant. It’s beyond the scope of this paper 
to explore in any great detail how this would go for the CSRM outputs of 
polytheistic religions, but there are resources in research on the history of 
religions that suggests a framework for further research along these lines.
In his article “Monotheism and Polytheism,” Jan Assmann traces an 
historically informed conceptual framework for analyzing polytheistic 
religions and notes their conceptual continuity and discontinuity with 
different types of monotheisms.17 According to Assmann, the first-century 
16Murray, “Scientific Explanations of Religion and the Justification of Religious Belief,” 
168–178; Murray and Goldberg, “Evolutionary Accounts of Religion,” 179–199; Barrett, 
Cognitive Science and Theology, 131–132. Also relevant here is that cultural scaffolding can 
account for much religious diversity, and Barrett’s work seems to show a significant degree 
of cross-cultural unity with respect to the outputs of religious cognition; he identifies and 
defends thirteen common cross-cultural non-reflective religious beliefs, such as immaterial 
agent causation and divine omniscience. 
17Assmann, “Monotheism and Polytheism,” 17–31. Assmann’s typology for theological 
themes in polytheistic religions are drawn from Roman, Greek, Egyptian, and Babylonian 
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BCE scholar Varro identified a helpful three-fold theological framework 
for Roman and Greek religion that also fits Egyptian and Babylonian re-
ligion. This, says Assmann, demonstrates “that we are dealing here with 
a rather general structure of polytheism.”18 This general structure sees di-
vine activity manifested in three main spheres: cosmologically the gods are 
involved in creating and sustaining the created order, politically the gods 
are involved and integrated in civic social structures, and mythologically the 
gods are agents in historical narrative events that have explanatory value. 
Assmann sees an historical development of polytheism with a hierarchical 
structure in the pantheon (with an emphasis on “high gods”), to belief in 
a supreme being (the Highest God), to belief in one God—this is dubbed 
“evolutionary monotheism,” and it expresses a religious outlook deemed 
to be “the final stage of polytheism.” In contradistinction to polytheism, 
“evolutionary monotheism,” emphasizes the falsity of other gods and 
the reality of the one true God, and the perils of worshipping false gods. 
Revolutionary monotheism further subdivides into “evidence-based” and 
“revelation-based” types, depending on how one acquires justified belief 
in the monotheistic God.
Now suppose that Assmann has correctly identified a general structure 
of polytheistic religions (and this would need to be confirmed on a case-
by-case basis). If so, it would be plausible to also suppose that it’s common 
for adherents of polytheistic religions to affirm as the outputs of CSRM (or 
via inference from those outputs) the following: the natural order is a cre-
ated order, the divine cares about human social structures, and a true and 
complete explanation of history must include divine agency. Those are all 
CSRM outputs (or inferences from those outputs) that theists can affirm. In 
varying ways, then, theists can look at the CSRMs operative in polytheistic 
religions and see that while tuned by culture and circumstances in ways 
that deliver false outputs, other alethically relevant features of CSRM 
allow the theist to tell an epistemically respectable story—one that is fully 
aware of the epistemic shortcomings of CRSM—along the following lines:
Yes, CSRM in the vast majority of cases deliver beliefs that are, techni-
cally, false. But, from a theistic perspective, it seems that even these false 
beliefs point to, or approximate, truth in some important respects—
pointing to the reality of the supernatural, for example, and leading to 
a view of the self as more than a mere collection of matter. Moreover, 
the false outputs of CSRM could entail many propositions—religiously 
significant propositions—that theists think are true. The fact that the 
entailment was generated by a false belief may not be as significant as 
the proposition that’s entailed by the false belief.
In sum then, with respect to Braddock’s unreliability argument, we can see 
that even if sound, it does not provide evidence for atheism—at most it 
polytheisms.
18Assmann, “Monotheism and Polytheism,” 18.
119COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION, ATHEISM, AND THEISM
would licence agnosticism. But moreover, we can see that the line between 
divergent polytheistic CSRM outputs and a theistic commitment to their 
unreliability is not as straightforward as Braddock suggests. Paying atten-
tion to other alethically relevant properties and conceptual continuities 
between polytheistic and monotheistic religions undermines Braddock’s 
premise (i), that is, that theists must hold that CSRM are massively 
unreliable.
Ontological Irrelevance Arguments. Earlier I said that “CSR provides a 
means of explaining why people believe in gods even if there be no gods.” 
This is because, on the model of CSR we are considering, one can easily 
imagine a possible world W like the actual world in every relevant respect 
and such that no God or gods exist in that world, and yet the phenomena 
of belief in supernatural agency in W looks exactly like it does in the actual 
world.19 For CSR, the existence of the object(s) of religious belief in no way 
factors into the explanation of why those beliefs arise in the first place. 
And this could be an indirect way in which CSR lends evidential sup-
port for atheism, provided that something like the following argument is 
sound:
7. On CSR, a subject’s belief in supernatural agents requires no causal 
connection to supernatural agents.
8. S’s justified belief in some X requires S’s being causally connected to 
X in the right way.
9. So, CSR shows that belief in supernatural agents is unjustified.
While (8) is an epistemological principle that some will find controversial 
because of its externalist leanings, my comments will focus on two ways 
by which (7) can be rejected.20
It should be noted that successful natural theology would negate (7).21 
For example, a successful cosmological argument would establish that 
God’s existence is necessary for the existence of any contingent minds, 
including those contingent minds that believe in supernatural agents. Or 
a successful fine-tuning argument would establish that God’s existence 
is necessary for explaining why we live in a universe conducive to life at 
all. Thus, if these natural theological arguments are successful, (7) is false, 
because subjects having beliefs—indeed the existence of contingent sub-
jects at all—requires certain kind of causal connection to God: the creator/
19Murray, “Scientific Explanations,” 168–178. 
20In brief, externalist epistemologies locate epistemic justification in processes that can 
function apart from the subject’s internal awareness that the justifying conditions obtain. 
This is contrasted with internalist epistemologies which hold that a subject’s internal aware-
ness that justifying conditions obtain is necessary for justification. For a good introduction 
to the internalist/externalist debate, see Lemos, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 
108–130. For a more in depth description and defense of externalist justification, see Berg-
mann, Justification Without Awareness.
21Murray, “Scientific Explanations,” 175–176.
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creature connection.22 Obviously, the natural theology response to onto-
logical irrelevance arguments is successful only to the degree that natural 
theology is successful. And while the best natural theology should give ill-
informed and non-reflective atheists pause, theistic arguments (including 
cosmological arguments and arguments from cosmic fine-tuning) tend to 
have an “escape hatch,” and rely on a premise or inference that can be 
rationally rejected if one is sufficiently informed about a host of relevant 
philosophical factors, costs, and benefits.23
However, a different way of rejecting (7) and one that doesn’t require 
endorsing natural theology is to adopt—as many do—a common-sense, 
fallibilist epistemology. To explain this response, recall Descartes’s evil 
demon and consider the possibility that we are just brains in jars having 
mental images fed to us by an evil demon whose chief goal is to feed us 
with false beliefs. Notice that there is a parallel between what the atheist is 
saying concerning CSR and what the global skeptic is saying about sense 
perception: both scenarios involve mass deception and license widespread 
skepticism concerning the outputs of a particular domain of cognition.
But most of us (epistemologists included) don’t think we’re brains 
in jars, or that we’re being fed mental sensations and images by an evil 
demon—even though there’s no way of proving that this is not the case. 
Instead, non-skeptical philosophers tend to help themselves to two prin-
ciples which, taken together, provide a plausible way of resisting global 
skepticism:
Fallibilism: S’s knowing that p is consistent with its being logically pos-
sible (but not actual) that S is mistaken with respect to p.
Common Sense-ism: If S’s belief that p is common and undefeated, then 
it is justified.
Fallibilism provides non-skeptical philosophers a basis for entertaining 
the possibility of one’s knowing some proposition p even if—as is the case 
on a demon hypothesis—it is logically possible that one is mistaken with 
respect to p. Common sense-ism provides non-skeptical philosophers a 
basis for the justification of the sorts of beliefs that global skepticism was 
said to undermine. Taken together, the epistemological burden of proof 
shifts to the skeptic.
What our discussion of Fallibilism and Common Sense-ism shows is 
that (7) is ambiguous in a way that is relevant for determining whether 
(7) is true or can do the work it needs to as a premise in an argument for 
atheism. Recall the claim:
22Again, it’s not the specific belief content for which the causal connection is required if 
some natural theology is successful—it’s the existence of minds at all which are necessary 
for forming beliefs.
23See also van Eyghen, “Two Types of ‘Explaining Away’ Arguments,” 966–982.
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7. On CSR, a subject’s belief in supernatural agents requires no causal 
connection to supernatural agents.
Now compare (7) to (7′):
7′. On a demon scenario, a subject’s belief that she has hands requires 
no causal connection between the subject’s belief and her hands.
According to the fallibilist, the sense of “requires” in (7′) should be under-
stood as “logically requires,” but because, on fallibilism, knowing that p is 
consistent with the logical possibility (but not actuality) of being mistaken 
concerning p, (7′) does nothing to defeat one’s justified belief that one has 
hands. A similar option is available for the fallibilist concerning (7); con-
sider (7″):
7″. On CSR, a subject’s belief in supernatural agents requires no causal 
connection to supernatural agents—that is, it’s logically possible for 
a subject to believe in a supernatural agent even if no such agent 
exists.
But if one has justified belief in supernatural agents, (7″) does no more to 
undermine justified belief in the supernatural agent case than (7′) did in 
the case of global skepticism.
However, one might wonder if the cases of external world skepticism 
and supernatural agent skepticism are really parallel.24 For example, one 
could object to my analogy and hold the following:
The demon scenario outlines a mere logical possibility whereas CSR 
has a stronger empirical basis and at the very least is assumed to be true 
in order to consider its philosophical implications. So we are not faced 
here with the mere possibility that we could forming a belief without 
the right causal connection. We are faced with a theory that says that 
we would (probably) form such a belief, whether or not the right causal 
connection existed. And this suggests that the mechanisms responsible 
for god beliefs, are not truth-sensitive, whereas we’ve no similar reason 
to doubt sensory faculties.25
However, this line of response makes two crucial assumptions. First, 
this objection assumes that one can make a justified inference from an 
ontological irrelevance claim to a negative existential claim—that is, from 
observing that one doesn’t need the existence of Xs in order to believe there 
are Xs (the ontological irrelevance claim), one is able to infer with justifica-
tion that there are (probably) no Xs (negative existential claim). Second, 
the objection assumes that this inference from ontological irrelevance to a 
negative existential claim is appropriate in the god belief case but not in 
the sense perception case. It is far from clear that one should grant the first 
24My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.
25This scenario is adapted from comments from an anonymous reviewer.
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assumption. A significant theme in the epistemological literature on global 
skeptical scenarios at least since Descartes is that ontological irrelevance is 
pervasive and extends to the common world of everyday objects, but that 
negative existential claims about objects of perception don’t necessarily 
follow.26 However, even if we grant the first assumption about whether 
the inferential move is justified—it will be difficult to outline a distinc-
tion between the domain of supernatural agent beliefs and the domain of 
sensory beliefs in an epistemically neutral, non-circular way.27
Matthew Braddock makes essentially the same point in his “Debunking 
Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion.” Braddock discusses 
an argument from the insensitivity of god beliefs (essentially, an episte-
mological version of the ontological irrelevance argument). The crucial 
premise, and one that Braddock ultimately rejects, is:
(D4) If the processes that produce our basic beliefs are insensitive, then 
we should suspend judgment about their reliability, in the absence 
of independent evidence for their reliability.
Braddock rejects (D4) for reasons similar to those I offered in rejecting (7) 
above: namely, mere awareness of insensitivity isn’t sufficient for doubting 
reliability:
Yes, awareness of insensitivity plus the fact that the relevant worlds are near-
by would give us reason to doubt reliability. However, worlds where there 
is no necessarily existing God (if such a God exists) are impossible worlds, 
and so are not relevant to assessing the reliability of our belief in such a God. 
To successfully make the case that accessible insensitivity entails a debunk-
ing conclusion, the debunker would have to show that a world without a 
necessarily existing God is a nearby world; and it is entirely unclear how the 
debunker could show that without relying on the question-begging assump-
tion that there is no such God.28
So, it turns out that neither ontological irrelevance nor insensitivity to 
truth provide reasons for rejecting the outputs of CRSM’s.
Paying attention to ontological irrelevance and alethic insensitivity, 
we can note that for any belief, we can distinguish between the cognitive 
circumstances that gives rise to the belief and the facts on the ground that 
make the propositional content of the belief true or false. And for nearly 
any belief there will be cognitive circumstances such that if the belief were 
formed in those circumstances, the belief would be insensitive to truth. In 
that respect, the observation of insensitivity by itself is uninteresting: it 
applies too broadly. What’s needed in order to make the objection hold is 
an additional support for the world-specific circumstances that give rise 
to the belief in question. As Braddock notes, with respect to theism, that 
will involve assuming that God, a necessary being, does not exist—an as-
26See also Thurow’s “Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to be Irrational?,” 77–98. 
27See chapter 3 of Alston’s Perceiving God.
28Braddock, “Debunking Arguments,” 284.
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sumption that one won’t want to make if one is looking to CSR to provide 
evidence for atheism.
Summary. CSR, it turns out, does not provide evidence for atheism. It 
provides no religiously-neutral empirical support for atheism such that 
CSR is more probable on atheism than on theism. Atheism neither best ex-
plains CSR, nor is CSR the kind of observation we should find surprising if 
theism is true. Moreover, attempts to utilize CSR in service of unreliability, 
ontological irrelevance, or alethic insensitivity arguments for atheism are 
also unsuccessful. Judgments of reliability and unreliability need to factor 
in scope and context, and it could be that while perhaps unreliable in some 
contexts (narrow scope), religious cognition is reliable in other contexts 
(wide scope). With respect to the ontological irrelevance of supernatural 
agents to belief in supernatural agents, according to a fallibilist, common 
sense perspective, the logical possibility of being mistaken with respect to 
p does nothing to defeat the justification of one’s belief that p.
I.C. CSR and Intellectual Aid and Comfort for Atheism
This is not to say that CSR is of no use to atheists. If one already is an 
atheist, CSR can yield a bit of existential security by providing what I call 
“intellectual aid and comfort.”
Undermining Some Religious Claims. For example, CSR does undermine 
some claims that could be made by religious believers. Suppose one held:
10. Widespread belief in gods is proof of some underlying, supernatu-
ral reality.
If one is an atheist, one can take comfort in the possibility provided by 
CSR that gods are ontologically irrelevant to belief in them. According 
to CSR, widespread belief in gods is evidence for underlying, natural 
cognitive processes that are geared towards accepting supernatural 
agency—nothing more.
Similarly, suppose one holds, as many religious believers do, some-
thing like:
11. The best explanation for my sense that God did X is that God did X.
This “best explanation” style claim shouldn’t cause atheists any anxiety, in 
part because CSR provides an empirically informed alternative explana-
tion for one’s attribution of divine agency behind some phenomenon X. 
CSR provides a model according to which one’s sense of divine agency 
in the world could be the product of entirely natural cognitive processes, 
and so much more work would need to be done in any particular case to 
show that the supernatural explanation of X really is to be preferred to a 
naturalistic CSR interpretation of X.
Worldview Coherence. Another thing CSR provides atheists is a few 
strands that can be used in the quest for a coherent web of belief. CSR is a ro-
bust explanatory framework for why people believe in gods. CSR explains 
why this belief is pervasive, cross-culturally recurrent, and very difficult to 
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dislodge. And while religious claims may not be impervious to truth, CSR 
shows how these pervasive beliefs at least may be held without requiring 
the underlying reality of the domain they are allegedly about. All this, I 
claim, should provide the atheist with some intellectual comfort. It would 
be troubling, intellectually, if given the rise of cognitive science there were 
was nothing like a remotely plausible natural theory of religion. But there 
is, so the atheist needn’t be troubled in that respect.
However, and this is a key point often overlooked by atheists who seek 
to use CSR in service of atheism, this “aid and comfort” only arises if one 
already is an atheist. CSR fits with certain things that atheists hold to be 
true and/or desire to be true—that should provide some comfort. How-
ever, CSR also fits with certain things that theists hold to be true and/or 
desire to be true. Intellectual aid and comfort is not the same as evidence.
II. CSR and Theism
II.A. Naturalism, Atheism, and Theism
Much of the preceding discussion concerning whether CSR supports 
atheism is also relevant for determining whether CSR supports theism. 
Moreover, one might wonder whether there are pathways of CSR support 
for theism parallel to the ones we considered for atheism: are there good 
arguments to show that CSR confirms a theistic hypothesis, requires the 
reliability of faculties that give rise to religious beliefs, or ontologically 
requires the existence of supernatural agents?
The prospects for using CSR to support theism along any of these lines 
are not good. I’ve already noted some of the challenges in using empirical 
observations as evidence for theism and atheism—particularly with the 
needed role for auxiliary assumptions and the difficulty in coming up 
with assumptions that are both independently plausible and can generate 
testable predictions. Theism fares no better than atheism when trying to 
support it as the best explanation for the data of CSR or in terms of the 
probabilistic reasoning captured in the Surprise Principle. Moreover, data 
from CSR certainly doesn’t seem sufficient to support a new type of ab-
ductive argument where God’s existence would be the best explanation of 
why we have religious beliefs. What about “reliability arguments”? Does 
CSR, contra common atheistic appropriations of the data, support theism 
by undermining atheism due to the reliability of our faculties that produce 
belief in gods?
Justin Barrett and Ian M. Church have recently argued along those 
lines, suggesting that CSR, while not establishing theism per se, does un-
dermine the epistemic plausibility of atheism. Barrett and Church argue 
that, given the vast majority of people who believe in at least one god, the 
minority position of the atheist is akin to the person in a nightclub who is 
perplexed when all her friends remark how many attractive people there 
are in the club, when she herself has reached the opposite conclusion. Her 
confusion is alleviated when she realizes that her friends have consumed 
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alcohol at the club which tends to cause the inebriated to view others as 
more attractive than they would otherwise seem—her friends are wearing 
their “beer-goggles” which impairs their judgment and causes them to 
make unreliable judgments. Similarly, the atheist might reason that people 
who believe in gods have impaired belief-forming faculties (BFFs) which 
results in their having false beliefs about the supernatural. Barrett and 
Church go on to assess whether the beer-goggles analogy is a sufficient 
defense against the epistemic pressure atheists should feel as a result of 
their minority position.
Barrett and Church adopt a standard model of CSR, according to 
which (i) religious beliefs in the existence of one or more gods, a soul, 
an afterlife, are cognitively natural, (ii) the cognitive faculties supporting 
religious belief is part of “general conceptual toolkit—not some religion 
specific faculty,” and (iii) these faculties incline toward, but don’t guar-
antee, religious belief. They go on to argue that the atheist’s beer-goggles 
defense is not strong given the dis-analogy between the beer-goggles case 
and the BFFs that yield these core religious beliefs: while we have clear 
evidence that alcohol impairs faculties, we have no such evidence that 
religiously tuned BFFs are so impaired. And as with all arguments via 
analogy, there’s always the worry about whether one has judged an ap-
propriate similarity or considered all the relevant factors in the scenarios 
being compared—more evidence may always come to light. For example, 
in the beer-goggles case, there might be special circumstances that cause 
alcohol consumption in this case to increase, and not decrease, faculty reli-
ability; or there might be special circumstances that cause the sober person 
to have unreliable faculties—an abundance of false positives doesn’t entail 
complete unreliability, with beer-goggles and assessments of beauty, or 
with BFFs that generate belief in gods. Moreover, given the standard CSR 
model that the BFFs supporting religious beliefs are part of our broader 
conceptual toolkit, they argue that skepticism about their outputs in the 
religious domain entails a much broader skepticism about their deliver-
ances in other areas.
On Barrett and Church’s view, atheists should feel epistemic pressure 
that comes from holding a minority view and shoulder an explanatory 
burden to demonstrate that their minority position is defensible in the 
face of their disagreeing with the vast majority of humankind concerning 
the existence of at least one god.29 CSR, on their view, adds to the atheist’s 
burden through CSR’s picture of religious beliefs as cognitively natural 
and part of a broader conceptual toolkit. The naturalness of religion and 
its being produced by faculties we typically take to be reliable in other 
domains means that the BFFs that yield religious beliefs can be dismissed 
only if one is willing to pay the price of a deep and pervasive skepticism 
about our cognitive faculties more generally. If Barrett and Church are cor-
rect, then CSR, while not supporting theism directly, does provide indirect 
29Barrett and Church, “Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance?,” 311–324.
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support for theism by undermining the plausibility of atheism. But have 
Barrett and Church successfully shown that CSR undermines atheism?
In my view, they have not. Barrett and Church’s argument seems to 
utilize the following epistemological principles:
Credulity: Absent defeaters, we are prima facie justified in accepting the 
deliverances of our faculties.
Majority: The vast majority’s believing p is good evidence for p.
Uniformity: BFFs are reliable or unreliable uniformly—that is, they are 
reliable or unreliable across relevantly similar domains.
Anti-Skepticism: Deeming the BFFs that produce religious beliefs as un-
reliable entails a broad, unwelcome skepticism about the BFFs more 
generally.
Notice, however, that as an epistemic principle, Credulity cuts both ways 
and is available to the atheist as well. The atheist who finds herself be-
lieving that the world lacks supernatural agency would, via Credulity, 
have prima facie justification for her belief. Barrett and Church claim that 
the standard model of CSR either defeats this prima facie justification 
(because we should think that the BFFs that produce religious belief are 
typically reliable) or leads to skepticism about the reliability of the BFFs 
that are responsible for belief in the supernatural (and for a host of other 
belief-domains as well).
Let’s consider the first horn of this dilemma: that CSR can defeat prima 
facie justification for atheism. In order to defeat the atheist’s prima facie 
justification for her atheism, Barrett and Church utilize something like 
Uniformity, and locate the burden of proof on the atheist to show that 
belief in the supernatural is relevantly dissimilar to “beliefs about human 
minds (including conscious beliefs, desires, emotions, and their relation-
ship to actions), the causal properties of the natural world, and so on.”30 If 
the atheist cannot show that belief in gods is relevantly dissimilar to belief 
in, for example, the mental states of others and the connection between 
mental states to actions, etc., then she is obligated to accept the reliability 
of the BFFs that typically produce belief in supernatural agents. She has 
thereby acquired a defeater for whatever prima facie justification she may 
have for her atheism. However, decisions about burden of proof are com-
plex, both with respect to whether and to what degree one bears such a 
burden, as well as to what counts as sufficiently having met that burden. 
How could the atheist describe the domain of supernatural agency as 
being relevantly dissimilar to other domains that fall within the range 
of the same BFFs without being guilty of ad hoc “special pleading”?31 It 
seems like the atheist who tells the following sort of story has sufficiently 
30Barrett and Church, “Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance? 316.
31Barrett and Church, “Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance? 316
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met the burden of supporting the relevant dissimilarity between super-
natural agent beliefs and other outputs of religious BFFs:
When it comes to Sue’s believing, say, that Bob is angry on the basis of 
Bob’s facial expressions, and Sue’s believing that Bob’s being angry is 
what caused him to punch the wall—cases like that are qualitatively 
different than, say, Sue’s believing that a god is pleased with her on 
the basis of her sense that a god is pleased her (maybe because Sue 
just finds herself with the sense that this is so, or because she infers 
that this is so based on her experiencing some material blessing), even 
if the beliefs in either case are produced by the same BFFs. Bob-cases 
are different from god-cases for the simple reason that Sue can directly 
see Bob. And Sue can’t directly see gods, if there are any. When Sue 
sees a Bob-filled region of space-time arranged a certain way (furrowed 
brow, clenched teeth) and sees Bob moving through space-time such 
that he strikes the wall with his fist, Sue just has much stronger sup-
port for her belief that Bob is angry and that his anger caused him to 
punch the wall than she does for her belief that a god is pleased with 
her. Partly this is due to the fact that, ontologically, Bob is similar to 
all sorts of other beings (e.g., Bill, Mary, and John) who, on occasion 
give facial clues that indicate anger and act in ways that suggest that 
their anger is a causal factor for subsequent behavior. Plus, I can get 
confirmation that these apparent instances of anger are actual instances 
of anger because there is a level of revelation and self-disclosure these 
agents are able to provide; that is, when I ask them if they are angry 
they can tell me. That doesn’t seem possible in the god case, or if it is, 
again there’s a qualitative dissimilarity to the way a god self-discloses 
the god’s mental states. Of course, this isn’t conclusive proof—I’m not 
giving an argument for atheism. I was asked for a principled basis for 
claiming that BFFs that generate both supernatural agent beliefs and be-
liefs about human minds could be unreliable in the case of supernatural 
agents but reliable in the case of human minds. And my answer is that 
human agents are empirically accessible in ways that gods, if any there 
be, are not; the possibility and actuality of seeing and engaging agents 
like Bob and Bill and Mary and John in ordinary, everyday ways, seems 
relevant to determining whether the BFFs are reliable in those instances. 
Attributing mental states to gods and attributing causal agency to gods 
just seems epistemologically risky in a way that doesn’t seem to be the 
case in making similar sorts of attributions when the agent in question 
is Bob.
It seems like an atheist who tells a story like that is able to sufficiently 
meet the burden identified of explaining, in a non-ad hoc way, how her 
initial and prima facie justified belief in atheism, is not defeated by the 
standard model of CSR according to which the same BFFs are responsible 
for supernatural agent and mental state beliefs.
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Barrett and Church have offered what to my mind is the most com-
pelling and sophisticated challenge to atheism based on CSR. However, 
Barrett and Church have not given a successful argument against atheism, 
and thus fail to provide any sort of indirect evidence for theism that would 
arise from showing that atheism is unjustified.
II.B. CSR and Reformed Epistemology
This is not to say that CSR is of no use to theists. If one is a theist, CSR 
should incline one to some version of Reformed Epistemology (RE). RE is 
a position concerning the rationality of religious belief according to which 
belief in God may be rational even if said belief is not formed via rational 
argument.32 RE is most commonly associated with its primary founder and 
most robust framer and defender, Alvin Plantinga. RE can be interpreted 
as making two general claims. The first claim is an empirical claim about 
how religious beliefs are often formed. The second claim is a philosophical 
claim about the epistemic status of those beliefs.
With respect to the empirical claim, according to RE, many religious 
beliefs are formed non-inferentially, or to use Plantinga’s terminology, 
are formed in a basic way. Common examples of basic beliefs are beliefs 
formed via memory, sense perception, introspection, and rational insight. 
With respect to memory, if I ask Sue what she had for breakfast earlier that 
day, in the typical case Sue won’t argue to the conclusion that, say, she had 
a bagel for breakfast. More likely she’ll just remember that she had a bagel 
and read off that basic, non-inferred belief in response to the question. 
RE claims that a large set of religious beliefs are formed in a similar way, 
namely, as an immediate response to experience. Thus, in many cases, ac-
cording to RE, people simply find themselves believing that certain things 
are the case with respect to God and divine agency. Oft-cited examples 
from Plantinga include finding oneself feeling convicted and believing 
that one has displeased God on the basis, not of another belief, but on the 
experience of, say, reading the Bible; or, perhaps one senses and believes 
that God forgives my sin upon praying for forgiveness. Plantinga dubs this 
epistemology “Reformed” because he draws in thinkers in the Reformed 
tradition who have been suspicious of the capacity or necessity of natural 
theology to prove the existence of God. Plantinga uses John Calvin’s term 
“sensus divinitatis” or “sense of divinity” to refer to the basic belief-forming 
cognitive process that produces belief in God.
There’s an interesting correlation between the religious epistemology 
Plantinga created from the comfort of his armchair four decades ago and 
the empirically informed CSR of the last decade. Recall that according to 
the standard model of CSR, belief in supernatural agents is among the 
32Reformed Epistemology has been a major topic in philosophy of religion and religious 
epistemology for nearly four decades, and as such has generated a huge volume of litera-
ture. Seminal works here include Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 16–93. See also 
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. For Catholic responses to Reformed Epistemology, see 
Zagzebski, Rational Faith. 
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cognitively natural outputs of non-reflective (i.e., basic or non-inferential) 
basic belief-forming cognitive systems. Similarly, according to RE, belief 
in God is the natural output of a basic belief-forming cognitive mechanism 
or sensus divinitatis.33 Empirical work in CSR has not disproved, and is 
consistent with, RE’s claims about how beliefs in supernatural agents are 
formed.
If the first dimension to RE is an empirical claim about the typical cogni-
tive processes that produce religious beliefs, the second dimension to RE 
is a philosophical claim about the epistemic status of beliefs produced by 
those cognitive processes. As a type of externalist epistemology, RE claims 
that in certain conditions, basic belief-forming processes can generate 
basic beliefs that have positive epistemic status, whether those processes 
generate beliefs about the past (as with memory) or beliefs about God (as 
with the sensus divinitatis). And if those processes are designed to be truth-
oriented, and successfully operating in the conditions for which they are 
intended, then their outputs are rational, justified, and may even satisfy 
conditions for knowledge.
Now, CSR doesn’t prove that RE is true, because CSR doesn’t make 
any philosophical claims about epistemic externalism in general or RE in 
particular. Moreover, even if one accepts CSR and accepts epistemological 
externalism, that wouldn’t be sufficient for CSR to entail RE. This is because 
what further needs establishing is that the causal processes that underlie 
religious belief are reliable. This is, in effect, what Barrett and Church 
were arguing in their paper discussed above. If Barrett and Church were 
successful, then CSR plus epistemological externalism would establish 
RE, because one would have (a) an empirically supported model of how 
religious beliefs are formed (establishing the first claim of RE), (b) an epis-
temological framework according to which reliable, properly functioning 
cognitive faculties are sufficient for generating rational justification, and 
(c) a reason for thinking that in certain conditions the cognitive processes 
that generate religious belief are (in certain respects) reliable. Recall that 
for Barrett and Church it’s the same cognitive toolkit that gives us reliable 
information about, for example, the mental states of other agents (and 
a host of other belief-domains) as well as religious beliefs. They further 
argue that when it comes to a certain level of supernatural agent belief, 
these generally reliable faculties are suddenly malfunctioning. However, 
I’ve argued that Barrett and Church have not successfully defended the 
reliability of the cognitive processes that generate religious belief insofar 
as the reflective atheist is concerned.34
33For more in depth treatment of the parallels between CSR and Reformed Epistemology, 
see Clark and Barrett, “Reformed Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 
174–189; see also Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Sci-
ence of Religion,” 1–37.
34If an atheist is prima facie justified in her atheism via Credulity, an epistemological 
principle Barrett and Church help themselves to, CSR does not undermine that justification.
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Conclusion
Although often taken to the contrary, CSR does not provide evidence for 
atheism. If one is an atheist, what CSR does provide is a bit of “intellectual 
aid and comfort.” But CSR doesn’t provide evidence for theism, either. 
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